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Supreme Court, U.S.
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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

ELAINE MATTHEWS,

Petitioner,

vs.

COLUMBIA COUNTY and RICHARD REYNOLDS,

Respondents.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1.

Should a county government be responsible for retaliating against a whistle blower in violation of the First Amendment where the motive to retaliate was shared by only a minority of the voting members?

2.

Should absolute legislative immunity protect a local legislator who takes administrative actions to terminate a specific employee where criminal penalties apply to prohibit the same conduct?

LIST OF PARTIES

The names of all parties to the proceedings in the court whose judgment is sought to be reviewed here appear in the caption of the case. There is no parent or subsidiary company of any party to be listed.

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

COMES NOW, Elaine Matthews and timely files this petition for review of a decision made by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in case number 01-10863 is reported at 294 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002) and is reproduced in the Appendix filed herewith ("App.") at **1a**.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals entered its judgment on June 19, 2002 and its denial of Petitioner's Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing En Banc on September 4, 2002. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

POSITIVE LAWS INVOLVED

U.S. Const. amend. I: (full text)
42 U.S.C. §1983: (full text)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1.

Should a county government be responsible for

retaliating against a whistle blower in violation of the First Amendment where the motive to retaliate was shared by only a minority of the voting members?

2.

Should absolute legislative immunity protect a local legislator who takes administrative actions to terminate a specific employee where criminal penalties apply to prohibit the same conduct?

ORDER FROM WHICH CERTORARI IS SOUGHT

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has decided that Defendant Columbia County is not liable for firing Mrs. Matthews in violation of her First Amendment rights even though the vote to terminate her was procured by someone who had accepted bribes to do so. Mrs. Matthews had disclosed to the County Commission that a potential contractor for management of the County landfill, Renaissance, had been in violation of federal law in Florida. Importantly, Richard Reynolds, and the others voting with Richard Reynolds, had accepted gratuities from Renaissance before the vote. Based on evidence that the Chairman of the Commission had received bribes from this same contractor before proposing that she be terminated, the jury found that she was terminated for speaking out on matters of public concern. The jury also found that the vote was procured by one member of the commission, the Chairman Richard Reynolds.

The Eleventh Circuit decided that the County

could not be held responsible because only the Chairman of the Commission was motivated to vote for her termination in retaliation for speaking out against the contractor. The Eleventh Circuit rejected Matthew's cross-appeal contesting legislative immunity for the Chairman.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 23, 1993, Columbia County Commissioners Reynolds, Titus and Ford voted to terminate Appellant Elaine Matthews' seventeen year career with Columbia County. At the time of her termination, Matthews was performing a variety of duties, including Department Head of Administrative Services, Personnel Administrator, Purchasing Agent and County Clerk. There is no dispute that she performed her myriad duties in a highly professional and efficient manner.

Richard Reynolds was elected to office in 1991 and took office as a Commissioner in January, 1992. He assumed the position of Chairman of the Columbia County's five member Commission in January, 1993. Around this same time, a sharp division developed between three of the Commissioners, on the one hand, and two other Commissioners Graybill and Farr, on the other. The most controversial issue was the disappearing available landfill of Columbia County. The debate centered on the resistence that voters showed to having additional landfill set aside in their respective neighborhoods. During the period

immediately before Matthews' termination, this issue was viewed with great interest by the local media.

Beginning in February or March 1993, Reynolds was approached by a representative of a company named Renaissance concerning the utilization of a mining recovery facility (MRF) that was suppose to expand the existing landfill capability in Columbia County. It claimed such a facility could mine the landfill for reusable and de-gradable products, clearing the soil and making it available for other use. This was otherwise known as a vertical expansion scheme.

Unknown to Matthews, Reynolds, in February, had, under the influence of various gifts and other personal inducements, assured Renaissance Environmental, Inc. (hereinafter Renaissance), that it would win a contract with Columbia County. Around this time, Matthews first learned of Renaissance from a local newspaper man who told her that Renaissance was in legal troubles with the U.S. Inspector General's office in Florida.

In the coming months, Matthews relayed various negative information about Renaissance to all of the Commissioners. She frequently spoke out about the questionable past that this organization had in Florida. She spoke directly to both Reynolds and the County Manager about some of the reports she had obtained which specifically called into question Renaissance's conduct in attempting to procure contracts in Georgia.

Reynolds effectively controlled a voting bloc of the three Commissioner which was opposed by the other two Commissioners. Matthews apparently became a topic of conversation between representatives of Renaissance and the voting bloc at several meetings that were held at a local restaurant. The voting bloc apparently thought that by conveying information to the two minority Commissioners, Matthews would impede the award of a contract to Renaissance. All of these three Commissioners took active part in the conversations concerning the fate of Mrs. Matthews. One of the voting bloc was quoted at trial as having said that "if anyone was going to go, its going to be Elaine Matthews." During this period, a decision was made by Richard Reynolds to propose Elaine Matthews termination in a layoff resolution. This resolution was presented to the Commission and approved by the voting bloc. Only one of the minority Commissioners was present for this vote and he voted against Matthews termination.

Matthews was fired shortly after the bids on the management of the landfill were opened and reviewed by the Commission. Although her official duties had required her to review the bids, she was denied access to them before her termination. She was ushered out of her office immediately after the vote even though she was given pay. After she filed suit, however, she was able to review the bid documents. On review she noted several bidding irregularities, including the early opening of other bids, a cash bond that was not procured until after the opening of the other bids,

handwritten insertions of prices that were marginally below the next low bid which had been opened early and before the procurement of the cash bond. Additionally, she noted that the evaluation process had been unusually favorable to Renaissance in that they did not file sufficient information to show that they had any assets. Renaissance was never able to procure a performance bond. Nevertheless, after her termination, the three Commissioners voted to go forward with attempting to obtain a contract with Renaissance. Only after a firestorm of bad publicity stretching over the following year did one of these three Commissioners finally vote against a final award to Renaissance.

As stated, Plaintiff was terminated in a so-called layoff for Columbia County. Even though a few other employees were laid off, Plaintiff was the only department head terminated. Additionally, Defendants went beyond eliminating Plaintiff's positions with Administrative Services. Defendants specifically fired Plaintiff from her position as County Clerk. This termination, although made part of the resolution passed by Defendant Commissioners, called specifically for Plaintiff's discharge. The position of County Clerk was immediately filled by someone else and the position of Purchasing Director was filed within a very short time. All of her other duties were farmed out to other Department Heads who received raises for the additional work. The net result was financial loss to the County.

At trial, Plaintiff successfully proved that she had spoken out on matters of public concern when she communicated matters regarding the integrity of Renaissance and its owners. Further, the jury specifically found that her termination was caused by her assertion of her First Amendment right to speak out on matters of public concern. In the interrogatories submitted to them, the jury found that only Reynolds, and not the other two members of the voting bloc, was motivated to terminate her in retaliation for speaking out about matters of public concern. However, the jury also found that Reynolds had swayed the other two members of the voting bloc because of his motivation to retaliate against her.

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

There is a split among the circuits regarding policy-making by local entities where a vote is taken to set the policy. Some of the circuits have required proof that a majority of the members of the decision-making body were specifically motivated to violate the protected right before it could be actionable under 42 USC 1983. As will be shown, this is contrary to Supreme Court precedent, at least with respect to employment decisions in violation of the First Amendment.

Additionally, this Court in *Bogan v. Scott-Harris* ,523 U.S. 44, 118 S. Ct. 966, 140 L. Ed. 2d 79 (1998), decided that local legislators should be absolutely immune where their votes were cast to

terminate a position, " which, unlike the hiring or firing of a particular employee, may have prospective implications that reach well beyond the particular occupant of the office." This case presents the question of whether or not such absolute immunity should be extended to the legislator that is violating the law to single a certain employee out for termination. In other words, is the taking of bribes to terminate a specific employee subject to absolute immunity if the action, on its face, is administrative.

ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITY

1.

Should a county government be responsible for retaliating against a whistle blower in violation of the First Amendment where the motive to retaliate was shared by only a minority of the voting members?

While admittedly the Circuits are split on this question, the existing case law from this Court would point to a result that is directly contrary to the one reached by the Chief Judge of the Eleventh Circuit. It simply makes little sense to conclude that the constitutional rights of an individual may be denied by the official action of a public body because the Plaintiff has not proved a specific intent to injure by each of a majority of the voting members. Rather, the finding of causation according to common law principles should

suffice. That is, liability should attach if the illegal motive of any one of the members causes the adoption of a policy which effectively retaliates against a plaintiff.

After rendering a monetary verdict for Matthews in this case, the jury then answered a series of interrogatories geared toward assessing the specific intent of each of the three Commissioners in the voting bloc. The jury indicated that Reynolds acted with the specific intent of depriving Matthews of her first amendment rights and that Ford and Titus, while not having the same specific intent as Reynolds, were swayed by him to go along with his decision to terminate Matthews.

In this case, the Jury recognized Reynolds as the head of the governing body and the man who had made the deal with Rena issance to get them the county's contract. But the Jury also recognized that Titus and Ford, while not having the same specific motivation, knew of Reynolds motivation and went along with it. Clearly, this should be enough to establish liability for the Defendant. In *Waters v. Churchill Cynthia Waters, et al., v. Cheryl R. Churchill, et al.*, 511 U.S. 661 (1994), this Court ruled that retaliatory actions, even retaliatory actions negligently imposed, would be actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

It is important to note that this Court specifically rejected the notion that an employer might be "unduly burdened by having courts look to the facts

as the employer **reasonably** found them to be." *Id.* The Court placed the onus on the employer to tread with care when there was a "substantial likelihood that what was actually said was protected" [speech]. *Id* p. 678. Accordingly, it should have been irrelevant what motivated a majority of the Commissioners in this case to retaliate against Matthews. Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit found that its own precedent in *Church v. City of Huntsville*, 30 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1994), required a fact-finding inquiry into the motivation of each individual voting-member of the governing body to determine whether or not an official policy that violated constitutional standards has been created by the vote.

The Circuits are split when local governmental officials vote to set a policy that potentially violates a right protected under 42 USC 1983. They have essentially utilized three (3) difference approaches to determining whether or not liability attached for a voting municipality. One such approach requires actual proof of an illegal motive by all the officials voting for the questioned act. Such is the case in the Eleventh Circuit where the case at bar arises. In *Church v. City of Huntsville*, (supra) the Court held that "[t]he imposition of municipal liability required by a decision by a final policy maker, not a 'principal' one" and further that "[t]he Plaintiff may not prevail on the basis of the actions or words of a single Council member...." In other words, the improper motive of one voting member is insufficient to establish governmental liability. *Church*, 30 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir.

1994). See also: *Mason v. Village of El Portal*, 240 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2001). Likewise, the Second Circuit in *Gupta v. Town of Brighton*, held that even though the Plaintiff in that case had made "allegations of improper motive by two of the board members, he has made no substantiated allegation that the remaining three board members were so motivated. As a result, there is insufficient evidence..." 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 12961 (2nd Cir. 1999). This is the most stringent standard in application and does not consider or take into account the knowledge or acquiescence of the other voting members in the illegal motive. Nor does it account for the political machinations that produce policy.

On the other hand, several Circuits have attached liability with only proof some portion of the voting members were motivated to retaliate. The Eighth Circuit in *Scamardo vs. Scott County, Arkansas*, held" "[w]e are not persuaded by the county's argument that a plaintiff in order to hold a municipality liable . . . must show that a majority of legislators were motivated by an impermissible motive before the case can go to the jury . . . . Even if the jury believed that only two of the nine . . . members were motivated by animus toward [plaintiff], it may have concluded that those two had successfully persuaded or influenced the others to vote with them." *Scamardo*, 189 F.3d 707, 710 (8th Cir. 1999). See also: *Azzaro v. County of Allegheny*, 110 F.3d 968 (3rd Cir. 1997); *United States vs. City of Birmingham*, 538 F.Supp. 819 (E.D. 1982). In *Azzaro*, the Third Circuit allowed a Title VII case to go to the jury where a "salary board"

had approved a discharge without any evidence that the board knew or approved of a retaliatory motive of the administrator proposing the elimination of the plaintiff's position. "To hold otherwise would be to grant public officials carte blanche to retaliate against employees as long as the retaliation is formally effectuated by the "rubber stamp" approval of another public agent." Id. (followed by *McHugh v. Board of Educ.*, 100 F. Supp. 2d 231 (DC Del 2000)).

In the Title VII context, several circuits, including the Eleventh, have adopted the so-called "cats paw" theory which would support liability even though the decision-making body is unaware of an illegal motive of a manipulator. *Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs.*, Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted)("[A] defendant may be held liable if the manager who discharged the plaintiff merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the 'cat's paw,' for a subordinate employee's prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent."); *Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture*, 235 F.3d 219, 227(5th Cir. 2000) ("It is appropriate to tag the employer with an employee's age-based animus if the evidence indicates that worker possessed leverage, or exerted influence over the titular decisionmaker."); *Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp.*, 217 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 2000) ("discriminatory comments ... made by the key decisionmaker or those in a position to influence the decisionmaker" can be used by the plaintiff to establish pretext); *Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.*, 154 F.3d 344, 354-55 (6th Cir. 1998)

("[Decisionmaker] rule was never intended to apply formalistically, and [thus] remarks by those who did not independently have the authority or did not directly exercise their authority to fire the plaintiff, but who nevertheless played a meaningful role in the decision to terminate the plaintiff, [are] relevant."); *Griffin v. Washington Convention Ctr.*, 330 U.S. App. D.C. 81, 142 F.3d 1308, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Evidence of a subordinate's bias is relevant where the ultimate decision maker is not insulated from the subordinate's influence."); *Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc.*, 163 F.3d 1236, 1249 (11th Cir.1998) ("In a cat's paw situation, the harasser clearly causes the tangible employment action, regardless of which individual actually signs the employee's walking papers."); *Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.*, 990 F.2d 1051, 1060 (8th Cir. 1993) ("A reasonable jury could have found that [the employee] used [the decisionmakers] as the conduit of his prejudice--'his cat's paw.' ").

An additional approached has allowed liability to attach with proof of an illegal motive of one or more members of a proven voting bloc. In *Scott-Harris v. City of Fall River*, 134 F.3d 427 (1st Cir. 1997), the First Circuit would not find municipal liability simply because a majority did not have an illegal motive to terminate Plaintiff. The *Scott-Harris* Court held however, that a sufficiently compelling case to allow relaxation of this standard could be made provided that the Plaintiff prove: (1) illegal motive on the part of the significant bloc and (2) circumstances suggesting

the complicity of the other in majority. (Followed by *Collins v. Nuzzo*, 244 F3d 246 1st Cir. 2001); *Union Pac. R.R. v. Village of S. Barrington*, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7985 (ND Ill 1998); *Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr. v. City of San Antonio*, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6259). This third approach is more in line with this Court's ruling in *Pembaur vs. Cincinnati*, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) and it recognizes the way most policy is set. That is, it recognizes that political policy is, more often than not, the product of compromises or political log-rolling where the evil motive of one person may well gain the complicity of others to produce an illegal policy.

In this case, this Court finally has the opportunity to resolve the different standards being applied by varying circuits across the country.

2.

Should absolute legislative immunity protect a local legislator who takes administrative actions to terminate a specific employee where criminal penalties apply to prohibit the same conduct?

As this Court pointed out in *Bogan*, (supra), the legislative immunity was recognized at common law to protect legislators in their conduct of legislative activities. Chief among these was the presentation and vote upon matters of traditional legislative prerogative. "Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it." Id. This Court stressed

the importance of avoiding the "cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury's speculation as to motives." Therefore, this Court emphasized that the basis of the immunity was consonant with the role of legislators as policy makers. In *Bogan*, this Court granted immunity because "the ordinance reflected a discretionary, policymaking decision implicating the budgetary priorities of the city and the services the city provides to its constituents." This Court specifically noted that the vote in *Bogan* did not involve the "hiring or firing of a particular employee" and thus the vote "may have prospective implications that reach well beyond the particular occupant of the office."

In the case sub judice, this Court has the opportunity to refine the differences between the "policy" and "administrative" decisions of local legislators and to clearly set a line that can be followed in judiciously applying the protection of absolute immunity.

Although Defendants have contend that Plaintiff was not terminated from the position of County Clerk, the evidenced showed otherwise. A reading of the resolution that was passed showed that she was specifically removed from the position of County Clerk and that someone else was placed in that position by virtue of the resolution. And although Defendants contended that it was irrelevant that the position of

County Clerk was, and still is, held by a full-time employee with the title of County Clerk, these facts present a clear question of where policy setting by legislators end and pure administration of the local government begins.

At trial, Reynolds admitted that he became involved in the administrative details of selecting which persons were to go in the layoff. In fact, he considered all the individual datum related to Mrs. Matthews and ninety other individuals before making his selections for termination.

All of this evidence indicates that the Commission was performing administrative duties in the selection of Matthews for termination. This Court is thus presented a clear question of whether or not the decision was sufficiently administrative to deny the cloak of legislative immunity.

To conclude that this decision was an administrative decision by Reynolds does not require an inquiry into the "subjective" intent of Defendants. On the contrary, an inquiry into the objective intent of Defendants reveals that this was the quintessence of an administrative decision. The uncontroverted facts show that Reynolds acted in an administrative capacity when he selected Plaintiff from "ninety" other individuals for termination versus selecting certain positions for budgetary cuts.

According to precedent existing before *Bogan*,

the proper inquiry is into the "functional nature" of the decision. (See: *Forrestal v. White*, 484 U.S. 219, 229, 108 S. Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed 2d 555 (1988), wherein the Supreme Court decided that a Judge was not entitled to judicial immunity because he made an "administrative decision" to hire and fire personnel in his office). Indeed, under the objective analysis mandated by *Bogan*, it is clear that the decision in this case was administrative and not legislative. Many Courts have now had the opportunity to analyze the acts of legislators against the backdrop of *Bogan*.

Since this *Bogan* decision, the circuits and various courts have split on when a vote is upon a legislative matter. Most courts have held that termination decisions which depend upon a subjective evaluation of the relative merits of two employees are administrative or executive decisions that are not subject to legislative immunity. See: *Acevedo Garcia v. Vera Monroig*, F.Supp.2d , 1998 WL 858500, November 23, 1998; aff'd 204 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000); See also: *Kamplin v. Curry County Bd of Comm'rs*, 159 F.3d 1248, 1250-1253 (10th Cir. 1998). See also: *Canary v. Osborn*, 211 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2000) wherein the Court decided that legislative immunity did not apply because there were no implications for the future. Although the position was said to be "abolished" the duties were retained and spread among other employees. The proper analysis is whether the decisions were "personalized assessments of individual employees" which are administrative decisions or "impersonal budgetary analysis" which

are generally legislative. See also: In Re: *Montgomery County*, 215 F.3d 367 (3rd Cir. 2000); *Campana v. City of Greenfield.* 38 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (E.D. PA.1999); *Boyd v. Village of Carol Stream*, 2000 WL 1700124 (ND Ill 2000); *Hawkins v. Baca*, 114 F. Supp 2d 987 (CD Cal 2000).

Thus, in the majority of the circuits, that the transactions that are deemed "legislative" relate directly to the process by which policy choices are made. However, the District Court and Eleventh Circuit here held that Reynolds was acting in his legislative capacity when he applied criteria to select certain individuals for layoff. (See contrary opinions of Eleventh Circuit before *Bogan*, *Smith v. Lomax*, 45 F.3d 402, 405-406, (11th Cir. 1995). (Quoting: *United States v. Brewster*, 408 U.S. 501, 517, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 2540, 33 L.Ed.2d 507 (1972)); *Espanola Way Corp. v. Meyerson*, 690 F.2d 827, 829 (11th Cir.1982) ("[T]he absolute immunity inquiry becomes one of whether the Commissioners in the instant case were engaging in legislative activity."), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 1431, 75 L.Ed.2d 791 (1983). Ibid.)

Before *Bogan*, the Eleventh Circuit, and others, consistently held that individual employment decisions were administrative acts. As in this case, the County Commissioners in *Smith* argued that they should be immune because they voted on Plaintiff's continued employment. The Court readily rejected the notion that the act of voting converted otherwise administrative decisions into legislative acts:

> Appellants argue, however, that we should not focus on the obviously administrative nature of their decision; rather, they would have us determine that the single act of voting for the person to be appointed clerk rendered their conduct immune from suit. We decline to adopt such a sweeping definition of legislative immunity. ... A legislative act involves policymaking rather than mere administrative application of existing policies.., 803 F.2d 129, 135 (5th Cir.1986) (citing *Hornsby v. Allen*, 326 F.2d 605, 608-09 (5th Cir.1964)). See *Cutting v. Muzzey*, 724 F.2d 259, 261 (1st Cir.1984).

The Eleventh Circuit not only rejected the notion that "administrative decisions" could be cloaked with legislative immunity by virtue of a vote, the Court specifically found that the vote on "reappointment" of a certain clerk was an administrative not legislative decision.

> ... Likewise, appellants' decision not to reappoint Smith constituted the application of a county policy, expressed in the Fulton County Code, see supra note 1, to a specific party. The decision was not general in nature; rather, it was simply a decision regarding whom to hire. In sum, we are obliged to adhere to our precedent and conclude that the appellants' vote to appoint Hanson to the clerk position was an administrative act and, thus, was not protected by legislative immunity.

Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 405-406, (11th Cir. 1995). In accord, with a contrary finding, *Wood v. Gamel*, 1998 WL 10235 (11th Cir 1998)). See also: *Yeldell v. Cooper Green Hosp., Inc.*, 956 F.2d 1056, 1062-1063 (11th Cir. 1992); *Healy v. Town of Pembroke Park*, 831 F.2d 989, 993 (C.A.11 1987).

Even more problematic in this case is the extension of such immunity into areas where the administrative decisions are themselves illegal acts. There were several rationales which this Court in *Bogan* found supported application of absolute immunity to local legislators. The first, and perhaps most important, was the need to protect "the exercise of legislative discretion" so that it would "not be inhibited by judicial interference or distorted by the fear of personal liability." *Id.* Secondly, "the time and energy required to defend against a lawsuit are of particular concern at the local level, where the part-time citizen-legislator remains commonplace." *Id.* Third, "the threat of liability may significantly deter service in local government, where prestige and pecuniary rewards may pale in comparison to the threat of civil liability." *Id.* Fourth, "certain deterrents to legislative abuse may be greater at the local level than at other levels of government. Municipalities themselves can be held liable for constitutional violations, whereas States and the Federal Government are often protected by sovereign immunity." Finally, "the ultimate check on legislative abuse -- the electoral process -- applies with equal

force at the local level, where legislators are often more closely responsible to the electorate." *Id.* It is respectfully submitted that not one of these rationales logically applies where the vote cast is over a purely administrative matter and is procured by an illegal bribe.

First, the concern about unnecessary judicial interference disappears in the face of a purely administrative vote procured by a bribe. In every such case, the danger of judicial interference would never disappear in that each bribe is made illegal by every state as well as by federal laws. Further, administrative decisions which are enacted to effect one individual were traditionally exempted from legislative immunity protection. Indeed, the Constitution of the United States specifically prohibited many such actions because they were considered to be bills of attainders. (See: Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of the United States).

Second, there is no need to insulate a local legislator from liability where he steps outside the traditional policy-making function to assume, as Reynolds did here, the administrative role of a full-time employee. Further, such protection is especially fruitless where the legislator has opened up his life and fortune to criminal liability for accepting a bribe.

Third, a legislator need only adhere to the bright line of avoiding criminal activity to avoid liability. Thus, limiting absolute protection to policy-makers

would not deter qualified candidates from running for these offices. If, however, one decides to run for such an office on the basis that he or she would be willing to engage in illegal activity, no such protection is desirable.

Fourth, in most cases where a legislator becomes involved in making administrative decisions, the local government will not be held responsible for illegal conduct. In point of fact, this case clearly illustrates the weakness of this argument when applied to local governments where one of the legislators prepares the legislation to retaliate against a certain employee. On the one hand, the local government argues that it cannot be held responsible unless an illegal policy was developed by a majority of the legislators. On the other hand, the local legislator who coaxes a clearly administrative decision in the form of a vote is absolutely immune regardless of whether or not he accepted a bribe to do so. The result is the firing of a seventeen year employee because she speaks out effectively against a potential illegal contract with a nefarious contractor. Although she has spoken out about a matter of clear public concern, she has no recourse when she is terminated.

CONCLUSION

The Defendant County seeks to avoid liability under 42 USC 1983 by proving that only one member of that voting bloc had the specific intent to retaliate against Ms. Matthews. However, no specific intent has

been required by this Court in its previous precedent. (See: *Waters*, supra). Furthermore, such a requirement is inconsistent with the goal of protecting employees from retaliation for speaking out on matters of public concern. This is particularly true where, as here, the other members of the voting bloc had knowledge of the nefarious purpose of Richard Reynolds.

In the case now before this Court, the legislators, Defendants Reynolds, Titus, and Ford specifically voted to terminate Plaintiff from her positions as County Clerk and as Department Head of Administrative Services, while retaining a significant portion of ninety other individuals considered for layoff. Although they eliminated other positions, Reynolds admitted that he specifically applied criteria to each individual to pick out those that should go from the persons who would be retained. Further, the evidence showed that Reynolds was motivated by gratuities and other inducements by Renaissance to get rid of Matthews. This hand selection of an employee should not receive the cloak of legislative immunity where it has the effect of encouraging wrongdoing.

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APPENDIX A - OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT DATED 6/19/02

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 19, 2002
THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-10863

D. C. Docket No. 98-00159 CV-DHB-1

ELAINE MATTHEWS,

Plaintiff-Appellee-
Cross-Appellant,

versus

COLUMBIA COUNTY,

Defendant-Appellant
Cross-Appellee,

RICHARD REYNOLDS, et al.,

Defendants.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia

(June 19, 2002)

Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, HILL and LAY*, Circuit Judges.

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*Honorable Donald P. Lay, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

This case deals with the question of whether a county can be held liable, under Section 1983, when some -- but less than a majority -- of the county's commissioners vote to eliminate a public employee's job for an unconstitutional reason. We conclude that it cannot.

BACKGROUND

This suit arises out of the elimination of Plaintiff Elaine Matthews's ("Plaintiff") job with Defendant Colombia County ("County"). Plaintiff was employed by the County as Director of Administrative Services. In 1993, the five member County Board of Commissioners voted to eliminate several County positions; Plaintiff s job was among those eliminated. Three County Commissioners -- Richard Reynolds, Diane Ford, and David Titus -- voted in favor of the resolution eliminating Plaintiffs job. The other two Commissioners either voted against it or were absent from the vote.

Plaintiff claims that the elimination of her job was in retaliation for comments she had made about

Renaissance Environmental Corporation, a company with which the County was considering contracting. She claims that the elimination of her job therefore violates the First Amendment. Plaintiff sued the County, Commissioners Reynolds, Ford, and Titus, and County Administrator Stephen Szablewski; the people were sued in both their official and individual capacities. A motion to dismiss the suit against Reynolds, Ford, and Titus in their official capacities was granted.

Later, Plaintiff filed, in Georgia state court, a Georgia RICO action against the individual defendants and against Renaissance and two of its agents: Jeffrey Nolan and Rick Byrd. This RICO action was removed to federal court and consolidated with the First Amendment claim.

Except for the First Amendment claim against the County, all of Matthews's claims were dismissed at various stages. Before trial, the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the state RICO claim. And, after the trial had started, the district court granted Reynolds, Ford, Titus, and Szablewski's motions for summary judgment on the claims against them in their individual capacities. The district court ruled that Reynolds, Ford, and Titus were protected by legislative immunity and that Szablewski was protected by qualified immunity.

Plaintiff s claim against the County was tried to a jury, who returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. In a

special verdict, the jury found that only one Commissioner -- Commissioner Reynolds -- was motivated by Plaintiff's "protected speech activity" in voting to eliminate Plaintiff's position. But the jury also found that Titus and Ford had been "influenced in [their] vote[s] by another Commissioner who was motivated to eliminate Plaintiff's employment because of the Plaintiffs protected speech activity[.]"[1] After the verdict was announced, the County moved for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. The district court denied the motion. The County also moved to set aside the jury's award of emotional and mental distress damages. That motion, also, was denied.

Both parties appeal. The County appeals the district court's denial of judgment as a matter of law on the claim against it and the district court's refusal to set aside the jury's emotional damages award.

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1 The district court submitted two verdict forms to the jury in this case. The second form --which included the two special interrogatories discussed above -- was submitted after the jury had issued a general verdict in Plaintiff's favor. On appeal, Plaintiff argues that it was error to submit the second form to the jury. But, at trial, Plaintiff told the district court that she did not object to the submission of the second form. Plaintiff cannot now complain about a jury instruction that she explicitly accepted before the district court. See generally, In re Carbon Dioxide Industry Antitrust Litigation, 229 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2000) ("It is a cardinal rule of appellate review that a party may not challenge as error a ruling or other trial proceeding invited by that party.").

Plaintiff cross-appeals, challenging the district court's resolutions of the suits against the County officials in their individual capacities and the RICO claim. We reverse the district court's denial of the County's motion for judgment as a matter of law, and affirm on all issues raised in Plaintiffs cross-appeal.

DISCUSSION

The County advances two arguments against the district court's ruling for Plaintiff. 1) Plaintiff s speech was not protected by the First Amendment; and 2) even if the speech was protected, it is improper to hold the County liable based on the im proper motives of only one commissioner. For the purposes of this appeal, we will assume (without deciding) that Plaintiff's speech is protected by the First Amendment. A district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law is reviewed de novo. See *Morro v. City of Birmingham*, 117 F.3d 508, 513 (11th Cir. 1997). We conclude that holding the County itself liable was error.

The determination of county liability in this case is somewhat complicated by the fact that the unlawfulness of the County's act is not apparent: reductions in force are a perfectly proper way for a government to get its finances in order. Instead, the unlawfulness can only be assessed by looking at the motives of those who enacted the reduction in force ("RIF"). See *Scott-Harris v. City of Fall River*, 134 F.3d 427, 437 (1st Cir. 1997) ("In cases like this one,

implicating the exercise of First Amendment rights, liability under Section 1983 can attach to the passage of a facially benign law only if one peers beneath the textual facade and concludes that the legislative body acted out of a constitutionally impermissible motive."), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. *Bogan v. Scott-Harris*, 118 S. Ct. 966 (1998). In this case, the jury found that Commissioner Reynolds did act with unconstitutional motive. But this determination does not settle the question of the County's liability.

That a local government "may only be held liable under Section 1983 if `action pursuant to official . . . policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort'" is well-settled law. *Church v. City of Huntsville*, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting *Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2719 (1989)). And, "[o]nly those municipal officers who have final policymaking authority may by their actions subject the government to § 1983 liability." Id. (quoting *City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik*, 108 S. Ct. 915, 924 (1988) (plurality opinion)). In this case, Commissioner Reynolds does not possess final policymaking authority by himself; that authority rests with the entire Board of Commissioners.

Because policymaking authority rests with the Commission as an entity, the County can be subject to liability only if the Commission itself acted with an unconstitutional motive. An unconstitutional motive on the part of one member of a three-member majority is insufficient to impute an unconstitutional motive to

the Commission as a whole. *Mason v. Village of El Portal*, 240 F.3d 1337, 1339 (11th Cir. 2001) (granting summary judgment to municipality where plaintiff had only shown evidence that one member of a three-member majority had voted to fire plaintiff for a discriminatory reason); *cf. Church*, 30 F.3d at 1343 (concluding that comments of one city councilman suggesting an unconstitutional motive was insufficient to show that the city council had authorized an unconstitutional policy).

Plaintiff attempts to get around *Mason* by arguing that Reynolds's unconstitutional motive can be imputed to the board as a whole because Commissioners Ford and Titus either ratified Reynolds's unconstitutional motive or delegated final policymaking authority to him. See *Praprotnik*, 108 S. Ct. at 925-26. In support of these theories, Plaintiff points to these things: 1) the jury's finding that Commissioners Ford and Titus were "influenced" by Commissioner Reynolds in voting for the termination of Plaintiff; 2) evidence that Commissioners Ford and Titus knew of Commissioner Reynolds's improper motive; 3) evidence that Reynolds, Ford, and Titus often voted as a bloc, and 4) evidence that Reynolds was the one who selected which County positions would be included in the layoff. Plaintiff's argument lacks merit; these considerations do not change the outcome of this case.

A delegation theory of county liability does not apply here. Local government liability can exist when

someone with final policymaking authority delegates that authority to someone else. But, the delegation must be such that the decision is not subject to review by the policymaking authority. See *Scala v. City of Winter Park*, 116 F.3d 1396, 1399 (11th Cir. 1997). Here, even if Reynolds was given the power to select which positions would be eliminated in the RIF, his selections still had to be accepted by a majority of the board. As such, Reynolds never possessed final policymaking power himself; and the delegation doctrine does not apply.

Nor does the doctrine of ratification apply. County liability on the basis of ratification exists when a subordinate public official makes an unconstitutional decision and when that decision is then adopted by someone who does have final policymaking authority. See generally, *Bannum, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale*, 901 F.2d 989, 998 (11th Cir. 1990). The final policymaker, however, must ratify not only the decision itself, but also the unconstitutional basis for it. *Gattis v. Brice*, 136 F.3d 724, 727 (11th Cir. 1998) ("A policymaker's approval of an unconstitutional action can constitute unconstitutional county policy only when the policymaker 'approve [s] a subordinate's decision and the basis for it.'") (emphasis in original) (quoting *Pranrotnik*, 108 S. Ct. at 926).

That Titus and Ford may have known about the unconstitutional basis of Reynolds's selection and vote or that Reynolds may have affected Titus and Ford's

votes by his influence is not enough to show that they ratified the unlawful basis by also voting for the RIF.

In reaching this conclusion, we draw not only upon our precedent, but also upon our belief that a contrary rule would put lawmakers in an unacceptable position. Lawmakers' support for legislation can come from a variety of sources; one commissioner may support a particular piece of legislation for a blatantly unconstitutional reason, while another may support the same legislation for perfectly legitimate reasons. A well-intentioned lawmaker who votes for the legislation -- even when he votes in the knowledge that others are voting for it for an unconstitutional reason and even when his unconstitutionally motivated colleague influences his vote -- does not automatically ratify or endorse the unconstitutional motive.[2] If we adopt the rule suggested by Plaintiff, the well-intentioned lawmaker in this hypothetical would be forced either to vote against his own view of what is best for his county or to subject his county to Section 1983 liability. We think the law compels no such outcome. We conclude, therefore, that, because only Commissioner Reynolds was actually motivated by an unconstitutional consideration, the County cannot be held liable under Section 1983. Mason, 240 F.3d at

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2 We think this proposition is true even where -- as Plaintiff argues is the case here -- the properly motivated lawmaker has often voted the same way as the improperly motivated lawmaker.

1340 ("[T]here can be no municipal liability unless all three members of the council who voted against reappointing [p]laintiff shared the illegal motive.") (emphasis added). The judgment of the district court on this issue must be reversed.

Therefore, we need not reach the damages issue raised by the County. And, we see no merit to Plaintiffs cross-appeals of the district court's resolution of the claims against the individual defendants or of the state RICO claim. We therefore affirm the district court on the rulings Plaintiff challenges on cross-appeal.

We remand this case to the district court, with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the County.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

APPENDIX B - DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC - FILED SEP 4, 2002

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U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-10863

ELAINE MATTHEWS,

Plaintiff-Appellee-
Cross-Appellant,

versus

COLUMBIA COUNTY,

Defendant-Appellant
Cross-Appellee,

RICHARD REYNOLDS, et al.,

Defendants.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia

ON PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING AND PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion, _____11th Cir., 19__, ____F.2d____).

Before: EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, HILL and LAY*, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The Petition(s) for Rehearing are DENIED and no Judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure), the Petition(s) for Rehearing En Banc are DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

J. L. EDMONDSON
CHIEF JUDGE

*Honorable Donald P. Lay, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.8